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Abstract 
Moral hypocrisy has been defined as “the motivation to appear moral while acting in 
one’s self interest, and therefore avoiding the cost of actually being moral” (Batson, 
Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). This is in contrast with moral integrity, or 
the motivation to actually be moral. Experimental research with adults has indicated that people 
are more highly motivated by moral hypocrisy than by moral integrity (Batson, Thompson, & 
Chen, 2002). However, this research has yet to be conducted with a variety of age groups. The 
present study investigated whether there are age differences in individuals’ tendency to engage in 
moral hypocrisy versus moral integrity. How does the desire to appear moral develop in relation 
to the desire to be consistent with one’s moral beliefs? Two hundred and sixty children, 
adolescents, and emerging adults from the Kitchener-Waterloo region were asked to make a 
decision in which it was possible to appear moral by endorsing fairness while choosing to act in 
accordance with their own self-interest. Results indicate that as age increases, self-interest 
decreases, and moral integrity and prosocial behaviour increase. Our experiment yields no age-
related trend with regards to moral hypocrisy. This research informs moral identity research and 
suggests that moral hypocrisy may not be as widespread or as solidified a motive for moral 
action as previously claimed. 
Keywords: moral hypocrisy, fairness behaviour, moral identity 
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Desiring to Appear Moral versus Being Moral:  
Development of Moral Hypocrisy and Moral Integrity 
 Current psychological research investigates the influence of concerns about fairness on 
decision-making. Social and developmental psychology have each addressed morality and 
fairness development; this study aims to bridge these discourses. This paper begins with an 
overview of foundational research in fairness and fairness behaviour, citing the work of Jean 
Piaget (1932/1965), Lawrence Kohlberg (1969), and William Damon (1977). It then discusses 
more recent fairness research, citing studies that borrow from behavioural economics, and utilize 
the dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). The concept of Moral Hypocrisy is 
introduced, with an emphasis on the work of social psychologist Batson. Moral hypocrisy is 
explained within the framework of moral identity, followed by an explanation of the current 
research hypotheses and procedural measures.  
Early Fairness Research   
Early research into fairness stems from the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. Through 
naturalistic observation and interview procedures, Piaget observed that children move from 
following authority mandates (moral heteronomy) to adhering to independent principles of 
morality (moral autonomy). Children learn to behave according to social rules through external 
cues from adults, and learn cooperation through their interactions with peers (Piaget, 1932/1965). 
As children progress from the pre-operational stage of development to the concrete operational 
stage, they become cognitively able to comprehend the perspective of others. Piaget’s research 
focused on moral reasoning and judgment, and did not make a clear connection between beliefs 
about morality and actual behaviour.  
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Kohlberg’s research advanced Piaget’s cognitive-developmental model of morality, also 
focusing on moral cognition rather than on moral motivation or action (Kohlberg, 1969). 
Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development proposes that individuals go through six stages of 
moral development: 1) obedience and punishment orientation 2) self-interest orientation 3) 
interpersonal conformity 4) authority and social order maintenance 5) social contract orientation 
and 6) universal ethical principles (Kohlberg, 1969). People shift from personal reasoning to 
societal reasoning, and finally to principled moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984). In this model, it is 
assumed that a person’s behaviour naturally progresses along with their moral reasoning.  
Kohlberg and Candee (1984) further linked moral judgment to moral behaviour. Their 
premise is that the more thorough an individual’s understanding of why a moral decision is right 
in a given situation, the more likely they are to behave morally. In this model, people first 
determine what is right in a particular situation. They then decide whether they have a personal 
responsibility to take the moral course of action; if so, they will act morally. Knowing and 
understanding what is right leads to moral behaviour (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). 
 Developmental psychologist Damon also finds that children’s reasoning about justice 
develops in a predictable and age-related manner (Damon, 1977). Based on experimental 
research with children and adolescents, Damon formulated six ‘early positive justice levels’. In 
the first, fairness is confused with personal desire. Children judge something to be fair if it 
coincides with their wants. Next, egocentric desires are justified by references to more objective 
criteria. At this age, children begin to realize that their moral judgments should reference some 
factor outside of their own desire. In the third level, fairness is equated with strict equality. 
Children do not consider individuals’ merit or need, and distribute resources perfectly equally. 
Fourth, the concept of fairness begins to reflect merit. Who is most deserving of a given 
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resource? In the final two levels, fairness involves compromise (weighing many factors at once), 
and is determined situationally. Overall, children’s ability to distinguish between practical and 
moral concerns steadily increases with age (Damon, 1977). Damon is careful to specify that he 
can predict an individual’s general tendencies or behavioural patterns from which positive justice 
level they operate at, but that his data is not predictive of behaviour in specific real-life situations 
(Damon, 1977).  
 A strength of Damon’s research is that he uses both hypothetical scenarios and actual 
decision-making experiments. Through these experiments, he concluded that children’s 
hypothetical reasoning functions at the same justice level as, or higher than, their real-life 
reasoning. This “lag” between hypothetical and real-life reasoning is demonstrated, for example, 
through children’s moral decision-making in distributive justice problems. Damon finds that in 
these situations, children often use lower modes of judgment, as lower modes are more 
egocentric and self-serving. Children demonstrate higher levels of positive justice reasoning 
when considering an imaginary moral story than when engaged in a real-life situation (Damon, 
1977). As such, Damon is the first to demonstrate that individuals’ behaviour lags behind their 
fairness understanding.  
 Blasi (1983, 1984) established the moral identity construct. In contrast to Kohlberg’s 
stage theory of moral reasoning, which was built on the premise that moral beliefs necessarily 
translate into moral action, Blasi believed that moral beliefs do not lead to moral behaviour 
unless these beliefs are held to be highly important to the individual. Consequently, an individual 
can know right and wrong, but still fall short in the realm of moral action (Blasi, 1984). This 
notion is key to the current study.  
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Development of Fairness Behaviour 
 Children display understanding of the mechanisms of fairness early on. In fact, children 
as young as 15 months old have been found to show sensitivity to fairness and are able to engage 
in fair and altruistic sharing behaviour (Schmidt & Somerville, 2011). Sloane, Barillargeon, and 
Premack (2012) found that at 19 months, infants already expect a person to divide two items 
equally between two individuals. Interestingly, this expectation vanishes when the two 
individuals are replaced with inanimate objects, as well as when the experimenter does not 
distribute the items, but instead removes covers to reveal items in front of the individuals to 
show they had been there all along. In a second study, Sloane and colleagues found that 21-
month-old toddlers hold a fairness expectation with regard to who should receive a reward for 
work completed. In this experiment, participants expected the researcher to give a reward to two 
individuals when both had worked to complete a chore, but not when only one individual had 
done the work. They only held this expectation when they knew the experimenter could tell who 
had helped and who had not (Sloane et al., 2012). These results suggest that the basics of fairness 
understanding exist early in development.  
 Despite an increase in the understanding of fairness when it comes to third party cases 
(when required to distribute items to outside parties), young children tend to behave with a high 
degree of self-interest in first party situations, when they are one of the recipients (Eisenberg & 
Fabes, 1998; Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2003; Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007; Kogut, 
2012; Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). When faced with a situation in which it is possible to do so, 
the majority of preschool-aged children will behave selfishly, making decisions that optimize 
their own gain (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rochenbach, 2008; Rochat, Dias, Liping, Broesch, Passos-
Ferreira, Winning, & Berg, 2009). Smith and colleagues (2013) highlight this disparity between 
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expectation and behaviour, finding that at this age, children say they should divide four stickers 
equally between themselves and another child, but do not predict that they would actually do so, 
nor do they when given the chance.  
 By approximately the age of five, children begin to behave more fairly. In fact, the span 
between age three to five is a developmental period when self-interest decreases significantly, 
and when fairness norms begin to trump self-regarding motives (Rochat et al., 2009; Svetlova, 
2013). Here, children move from strict use of the equality principle (where everyone receives 
equal resources) to the distribution of resources on the basis of need. At five years of age, 
concern for need can override the equality principle, with children choosing fairness even when 
it conflicts with self-interest (Svetlova, 2013). Research on the identifiable victim effect, which 
refers to “people’s greater willingness to share resources with identified targets than to share 
with unidentified or statistical targets” with child samples shows that including identifying 
information about a needy recipient increases fairness behaviour, but only in older children 
(Kogut, Slovic, & Vastfjall, 2016, p. 353).  
In addition to developmental changes with regards to equality versus need, the manner in 
which children distribute resources also changes. Children ages 3-5 tend to follow the equal 
numbers rule, and divide toys numerically equally, but choose to take the largest advantage 
possible, ignoring the toys’ qualitative value. The decision to divide toys numerically equally 
and qualitatively equally emerges in middle childhood, around the age of 6-8 (Sheskin, 2013).  
Fehr and Schmidt’s inequity aversion hypothesis is valuable in explaining children’s 
fairness behaviour, as it distinguishes between advantageous and disadvantageous inequity (Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999). In laboratory experiments, the equitable outcome is most often synonymous 
with the equal outcome, as participants possess no additional information about each other. It is 
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assumed that the equal allocation of resources is the equitable allocation. Evidently, children of 
all ages are concerned with receiving less than another child, but do not become concerned with 
another child receiving less than themselves until middle childhood (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; 
Robbins, 2013; Fehr et al., 2008). Robbins (2013) finds that an aversion to both types of inequity 
emerges between the ages of 5 and 7; Fehr and colleagues (2008) find it develops between ages 7 
and 8. Williams and More (2016) find evidence that motivations for fairness and equality differ 
depending on context, and that an across-the-board aversion to inequality is not the primary 
guide of decision-making throughout childhood. A cross-cultural study found that 
disadvantageous inequity aversion emerged across populations of 7 diverse societies by middle 
childhood, and advantageous inequity emerged in only 3 of the 7, and then only later in 
development (Blake et al., 2015).  
Inequity aversion can become strong enough that North American children between ages 
6-8 choose to throw away a resource rather than be forced to distribute resources unequally 
between two children (Shaw & Olsen, 2012; Shaw, Montinari, Piovesan, & Olson, 2014). In a 
cross-cultural comparison, Paulus (2015) finds Ugandan children will distribute unequally rather 
than throwing a remaining resource away. Alternatively, Sheskin (2013) finds that children age 
5-10 would rather another person receive the same amount as themselves rather than more, but 
they also prefer for them to receive less than themselves rather than the same amount. Though 
such discrepancies do exist in the literature on fairness behaviour – perhaps due to cultural 
effects or type of resource used (whether money or tokens, etc., Gummerum et al., 2008) – 
results consistently demonstrate that children’s expectations and actual behaviour become more 
sophisticated and fairness-oriented as they age.  
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The Dictator Game as a Measure of Fairness Behaviour  
 
 Designed by behavioural economists Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986), the dictator 
game measures individuals’ fairness preferences using the simplest definition of fairness: two 
individuals receiving identical outcomes (equality). The game involves a proposer and an 
anonymous receiver. The proposer is given a sum of money, tokens, or other goods. He or she is 
then told that they can, but do not have to, share their resources with the anonymous receiver. 
The question is simple: what percentage would they like to share? Most dictator game research 
has been conducted with university students, who allocate an average of 10-25% of their 
resources to the anonymous other (Camerer & Fehr, 2003; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1994). 
By comparing these results with the few studies involving child and adolescent samples, we gain 
further insight into the development of fairness tendencies.  
 The majority of dictator game studies conducted with children and adolescents reveal that 
younger children tend to offer less than older children and adults (Harbaugh & Krause, 2000; 
Benenson et al., 2007; Sally & Hill, 2006; Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 
2010). Despite this general trend, select studies have yielded competing results. Lucas, Wagner, 
and Chow (2008) found that four-year-olds were actually more altruistic than their adult 
counterparts, and Ongley and Malti (2014) found that dictator game offers increased specifically 
for boys between ages four and eight, and decreased again between the ages of eight and twelve. 
Gummerum, Keller, and Takezawa (2008) found no significant age differences in the allocations 
of children versus adults, each allocating on average between 35-40 percent of their resources. 
A modification of the dictator game, the ultimatum game (Guth, Schmittberger, and 
Schwarz, 1982) is similar in style, only the receiver can either choose to accept or reject the 
proposed allocation of resources. If accepted, both take home the proposed amount of resources; 
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if rejected, both parties receive nothing. Ultimatum game proposals typically consist of 30-50% 
of resources (Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2003; Camerer & Fehr, 2003). Both dictator and 
ultimatum games have been widely used in economic game theory to describe and predict 
strategic interactions and outcomes (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Camerer & 
Fehr, 2003). The current study uses a measure similar to the dictator game, with some 
adaptations. 
 Of course, whether offers increase or decrease with age is not the only information we 
can glean from this research. Participants can also choose to share zero percent of their 
resources, or to give away 100 percent. Whether pertaining to the dictator game or to the 
ultimatum game, research shows that sharing nothing decreases with age, as does sharing all 
(Gummerum et al., 2010; Ongley & Malti, 2014; Kogut, 2012). In one ultimatum game study, 
the only participants to offer all were in the youngest age group (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998). 
The tendency to share exactly equal in both games was found to be strongest in children ages 7-
10 (Kogut, 2012), and most likely for children age 9 (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998). Girls are 
found to be more likely to make perfectly fair proposals than boys, and are more altruistic overall 
(Murnighan & Saxon, 1998; Gummerum et al., 2008, 2010). In the majority of these studies, 
children and adolescent’s beliefs and behaviour regarding fairness continues to develop with age, 
and, as Damon predicted, their actual behaviour tends to lag behind their beliefs.  
Moral Hypocrisy  
 
Blasi claimed that moral behaviour is influenced by three factors: the importance of 
morality to the self, a sense of personal responsibility for moral action, and a motive for self-
consistency (1983). An individual’s moral behaviour is motivated in part by the desire for their 
external actions to match their internal beliefs.  In other words, their behaviour is motivated by 
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moral integrity. Moral hypocrisy, in contrast, is defined as “the desire to present oneself as moral 
while actually acting in one’s own self-interest” (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & 
Wilson, 1997). Batson proposes another motive: the desire to appear fair rather than to be fair. 
Moral hypocrisy has also been described as “the deceptive pursuit of self-interest in which the 
individual violates his or her own moral standards” (Naso, 2006, 2007), or “when a person 
endorses a moral standard yet behaves in violation of it” (Tong & Yang, 2011). Though 
alternative models and theories of moral hypocrisy exist (Frimer & Oakes, 2014; Lammers, 
Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; Larson & Capra, 2009), the current study utilizes Batson’s definition. 
Though both early and modern studies in developmental psychology support the idea that 
children develop a more sophisticated understanding of fairness and become more fairness-
oriented in their actual behaviour as they age, social psychologist Batson claims that fairness 
behaviour is actually motivated by the desire to appear moral rather than to be moral (Batson et 
al., 1997; 1999; 2002; 2011). The following is a summary of Batson’s methods, findings, and 
conclusions.  
In an initial paper, Batson and colleagues (1997) asked 80 female undergraduate students 
to assign either themselves or another participant to a task that yielded positive consequences and 
the other to a dull, boring task. In the positive consequence task, one had the chance to win a 
raffle ticket, and in the neutral consequences task, there was no such opportunity. In the first 
study, the concept of morality was not mentioned. Sixteen of twenty participants assigned 
themselves to the positive consequences task, while in retrospect, only one participant said they 
had made a moral choice. In a second study, participants were given a choice of moral strategies: 
either flip a coin, or accept their task assignment by the experimenter. Ten out of twenty chose to 
flip the coin. Out of these ten, nine assigned themselves to the positive task. In study three, 
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participants were far more likely to apply the experimenter’s task assignment when assigned to 
the positive consequences task (Batson et al., 1997). Results consistently seemed to reveal a 
motivation to appear moral while benefiting oneself; far more participants reported having 
flipped a coin to assign themselves to the positive consequences task than expected by chance.  
In a series of follow-up studies (Batson, Thompson, Sueferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 
1999; Batson et al., 2002), Batson and colleagues address potential self-deception strategies that 
could be involved in the ‘how’ of moral hypocrisy (1999), as well as potential alternative 
hypotheses. Through the investigation of two self-deception strategies, two alternative 
hypotheses were eliminated: 1) that participants who engage in moral hypocrisy actually 
misperceive their own behaviour as being moral and 2) that these participants are able to simply 
avoid comparing their own behaviour to any moral standard (see Batson et al., 1999). Study one 
involved labelling the coin, which cancelled out any ambiguity on whether the participants had 
been assigned heads or tails; study two tested the comparison of behaviour to a moral standard 
through a self-awareness manipulation (the presence of a mirror). Labelling the coin did nothing 
to increase the fairness of the task assignment among those who flipped it; conversely, the 
presence of a mirror made the coin flip fair (exactly 50/50). Evidently, self-awareness decreased 
moral hypocrisy in this case.  
 Batson and colleagues’ (2002) paper tested the alternative hypothesis that it was salience 
of social evaluation, and not personal evaluation that accounted for the coin flip becoming fair in 
front of a mirror. In this case, researchers manipulated privacy. Participants were either told 
“you’ll work independently, and never meet” (private condition), or “after you’re done, you’ll 
meet and discuss your thoughts, feelings, and experience” (public condition). Results again 
leaned heavily toward moral hypocrisy: all ten participants in the private condition assigned 
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themselves to the positive consequences task (with four choosing to flip the coin), and in the 
public condition, the awareness that the other participant knew they were making the decision 
led more people to flip the coin and record that they had done so, but did not lead the outcome of 
the coin flip to be more fair. In a study conducted with younger participants, most 6-8 year olds 
were fair towards their counterparts when they knew an experimenter was aware of their choices. 
Fewer children, however, behaved fairly when their choice was hidden from experimenters 
(Shaw et al., 2014). In a second experiment, older children were more likely to use a coin flip to 
decide which of two prizes to give to themselves, but they were just as likely to assign 
themselves the better prize by reportedly winning the coin flip as younger children were (Shaw 
et al., 2014). However, among children who chose to flip the coin, 62.2% reported winning the 
coin flip. Although this percentage is indeed greater than the 50% expected due to chance, it 
remains much less than the 80-85% reported by Batson.  
 The standard explanations of why people fail to act morally are that they lack moral 
judgment, or are under situational pressures that cause them to act in self-interest (Batson, 2011). 
The above research, however, proposes that what we are actually seeing is a lack of truly moral 
motivation. The current study uses an adaptation of Batson’s well-developed paradigm, but there 
are others who make similar claims with regards to moral motivation. Frimer and colleagues, for 
example, also address the paradox that though most people claim to be prosocial, the majority 
choose to behave selfishly (Frimer & Oakes, 2014). This inconsistency is taken as evidence that 
individuals have two distinct motives: appearance motives (the desire to appear prosocial to 
others), and behavioural motives (the desire to behave in a way that benefits the self). Frimer, 
Schaefer, and Oakes (2014) further develop this concept by concluding that this inconsistency 
translates into two motivated selves: the actor, or watched self, and the agent, or self as executor. 
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While the actor is motivated to behave morally, the agent is motivated to act in their own self-
interest.  
Researchers Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007) address a similar issue with the concept of 
“moral wiggle room”. Dana and colleagues asked participants to decide either to remain ignorant 
of how their actions affected someone else’s earnings, or to click a button to find out how they 
were affected. When participants were able to choose, half of them chose to remain uninformed, 
and chose to behave selfishly. When participants were unable to choose, and were simply told 
how their actions would affect the other, the majority of them behaved more altruistically. A 
follow up study confirmed Dana and colleagues’ findings: indeed, weakening the connection 
between actions and outcomes once again caused fair behaviour to decrease significantly (Larson 
& Capra, 2009). In a study addressing the implications of moral hypocrisy in the business world, 
Batson and colleagues find that the presence of such wiggle room is associated with higher rates 
of morally hypocritical behaviour (Batson, Collins, & Powell, 2006).  
Now What? Addressing the discrepancy 
 If Batson’s theory of moral hypocrisy does not completely contradict traditional research 
into fairness development, it certainly launches a problematic competing explanation of moral 
behaviour. Though most fairness research finds that fairness understanding and behaviour 
increase with age, and that self-interest decreases with age, Batson’s research suggests that 
people do not actually become more concerned with fairness and morality as they age. Instead, 
he argues, people simply become more concerned with appearing moral. How can we address 
this discrepancy? Psychological research into children’s fairness behaviour has not delved into 
the motivations behind children’s fairness actions, and despite briefly speculating as to the 
developmental origins of moral hypocrisy – namely, through modeling and through learning that 
DEVELOPMENT	OF	MORAL	HYPOCRISY	AND	MORAL	INTEGRITY	
	
13	
one can go unpunished for misbehavior if kept under wraps (see Batson, 2011, 2015) – Batson 
does not extend his research to include child and adolescent samples. Is moral hypocrisy indeed 
general to human nature? Or do developmental changes exist in the tendency to engage in moral 
hypocrisy versus moral integrity? Perhaps the answer is informed in part by the concept of moral 
identity.   
Moral Hypocrisy: a form of Moral Identity  
 
Moral identity is defined as the extent to which a person views moral values as central to 
his or her identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Arnold, 1993; Colby & Damon, 1992; Hardy & Carlo, 
2005, 2011; Hart & Fegley, 1995). An individual has a strong moral identity if they feel that 
being a moral person (for example, being fair, honest, and caring) is central to who they are. 
Moral identity has been linked to the experience of moral emotions such as guilt, shame, and 
pride (Blasi, 1983; Nunner-Winkler, 2007; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), as well as 
moral action in the form of pro-social or anti-social behaviour (Blasi, 1983; Frimer & Walker, 
2009; Krettenauer, Colasante, Buchmann, & Malti, 2014, Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015). 
Experienced and anticipated moral emotions shift with age. Positive feelings after moral 
transgressions tend to decrease with age (Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006), while positive 
feelings after moral decisions increase (Krettenauer et al., 2014). Additionally, Nunner-Winkler 
(2007) found that moral motivation – the willingness to do what one knows to be right even 
when it entails personal costs – is also positively correlated with age.  Recent research into moral 
identity formation across the lifespan suggests that this formation continues past adolescence and 
into middle age, with participants’ moral identity gradually becoming stronger from adolescence 
throughout adulthood (Krettenauer, Murua, & Jia, 2016).  
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The critical period for moral identity formation is believed to be adolescence and 
emerging adulthood (Frimer & Walker, 2009, Hardy & Carlo, 2011). During this age period, 
moral identity research suggests that it becomes increasingly important to act in a manner that is 
morally consistent with one’s beliefs (Batson’s research would suggest it only becomes 
increasingly important to appear to act morally). Although empirical research on developmental 
change during these years is scarce (see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015), the findings seem to 
encompass a shift from external moral motivation to internal moral standards (Krettenauer, 
2011; Krettenauer & Victor, in press). In other words, adolescents’ reasoning as to why they 
acted in a certain way shifts from referencing outside forces, such as obedience to the law, to 
referencing personal values. This discussion corresponds in part to Frimer’s claim that human 
beings have two distinct motives: appearance motives (desire to appear prosocial to others), and 
behavioural motives (desire to behave in a way that benefits the self) (Frimer & Oakes, 2014; 
Frimer, Schaefer, & Oakes, 2014).  
When informed by moral identity research, it becomes apparent that moral hypocrisy can 
be understood as an external form of moral identity. From this viewpoint, developmental 
changes in morality are attributed to the motivation to maintain the appearance of being fair. 
Instead of experiencing a growing motivation to maintain self-consistency and adhere to 
developing fairness beliefs, children, adolescents, and emerging adults simply become more 
highly concerned with presenting themselves in a good way.  
The Current Study  
 Research Methods and Hypotheses . The current study investigates whether there are 
age differences in the tendency to engage in moral hypocrisy versus moral integrity. In other 
words, how does the desire to appear moral develop in relation to the desire to be consistent with 
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one’s moral beliefs? Is the tendency toward moral hypocrisy present in children? If so, at what 
age does it appear? Does moral hypocrisy increase in adolescence, and moral integrity remain 
stagnant? Alternatively, do both tendencies increase with age? We use a similar procedure to that 
of social psychologist Batson (Batson et al., 1997), with two slight variations: the use of a ticket 
draw instead of a coin flip, and the inclusion of a satisfaction measure.  
Our hypotheses were as follows. As age increased, we expected that individuals’ 
tendency to act in pure self-interest would decrease. We also expected that as age increased, the 
number of participants to act with moral hypocrisy as well as the number of participants to act 
with moral integrity would increase. Our expectation that moral integrity would increase reflects 
the body of research showing that age is associated with the increasing sophistication of fairness 
beliefs and behaviour, while the expectation that moral hypocrisy will also increase is founded in 
Batson’s findings and those of Shaw and colleagues (2014). Shaw and colleagues find moral 
hypocrisy at a rate of 11% in children ages 6-8, and a rate of 13% in children ages 9-11. Since 
Batson reports rates of 30-35% in adults, we expected to find an increase in morally hypocritical 
behaviour across childhood and adolescence.  
In addition to these three main hypotheses, we explored the question of satisfaction. How 
satisfied are participants with the decision they make? Is there a relationship between the level of 
satisfaction and the decision-making pattern? Are the participants who engage in moral 
hypocrisy more or less satisfied with their decision than those who engage in moral integrity? To 
measure level of satisfaction, participants were asked to rate their level of happiness with their 
decision on a scale of 1-5 before proceeding to the subsequent portion of the interview.  
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Method 
 This MA thesis project is part of a larger study into the development of morality, sense of 
self, and emotions across childhood and adolescence. In the larger study participants were asked 
to complete an interview and a questionnaire in addition to the decision-making task that is the 
focus of the present study. The decision-making task preceded the interview and questionnaire 
for age groups 1, 2 and 4 (grades 4 & 5, grades 7 & 8, 1st/2nd year university) and preceded the 
interview for age group 3 (grades 10 & 11). In the latter case, there was a considerable time lapse 
of up to four weeks between filling out the questionnaire in a classroom setting and participating 
in the decision-making task. 
Sample 
Participants were 260 individuals from Grades 4-5 (n = 65; M = 10.11, SD=0.70, range = 
9-11.92, 39 females), Grades 7-8 (n = 68, M = 13.26, SD = 0.53, range = 12-13.92, 30 females), 
Grades 10-11 (n = 57; M = 16.00, SD = 0.67, range = 15-17.83, 32 females), and first- and 
second-year university students (n = 70, M = 19.21, SD=1.54, range=18-26.25, 34 females). 
Overall, the sample was comprised of 51.9% females (n = 135). Seventy-eight percent of 
participants were born in Canada (n = 205), and 21.2% were born outside of Canada (n = 55). 
Parents’ highest level of education was used as a measure of socioeconomic status. Interviewers 
asked participants for their father and mother’s highest education level, and selected an option 
from the following list: some high school studies, completed high school, some college or 
university studies, completed college diploma, completed undergraduate degree, some 
postgraduate studies, completed graduate or professional degree. A Kruskal-Wallis test showed 
no significant differences in mean rank of father’s education level between age groups (χ2 (3, n = 
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242) = 5.003, p = 0.172) and no significant differences in mean rank of mother’s education level 
between age groups (χ2 (3, n = 247) = 0.275, p = 0.965).  
Participants in grades 4 and 5 (middle childhood), grades 7 and 8 (early adolescence), and 
grades 10 and 11 (middle adolescence) were recruited through the Waterloo District School 
Board and the Waterloo Catholic District School Board. Participants in the first- or second-year 
university (emerging adult) group were recruited through Wilfrid Laurier University’s 
Psychology Research Experience Program (PREP), which encourages undergraduate students to 
participate in psychological research studies in exchange for course credit. Participants in grades 
4 and 5 and grades 7 and 8 were compensated an honorarium of $7; participants in grades 10 and 
11 received $10 for completing the questionnaire, $20 for completing the interview portion on 
their school premises, and $25 for completing the interview at Dr. Tobias Krettenauer’s 
Morality, Self, and Emotions lab (Wilfrid Laurier University, Northdale Campus). Participants in 
the first- and second-year university sample received one course credit on Wilfrid Laurier 
University’s PREP system. Participants younger than 18 years of age provided informed written 
consent from a parent or guardian; university students provided written informed consent. All 
participants provided verbal assent prior to testing.  
Procedure 
Participants were interviewed by undergraduate or graduate students who were trained in 
interview techniques. Those in the youngest two age groups were interviewed on their school 
premises during nutrition breaks. Most participants in the middle adolescent age group were 
interviewed after school hours at their high schools. Individuals in the late adolescence/emerging 
adult sample, and a portion of the middle adolescent sample were interviewed at Dr. 
Krettenauer’s research lab. Each participant was tested individually, either in separate rooms, or 
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at separate tables in a shared workspace such as a library. Classroom teachers were asked to fill 
out a form pertaining to the child’s social development and behaviour, which includes questions 
from the Child Behaviour Scale (Ladd & Profilet, 1996) and the Strengths & Difficulties 
Questionnaire (Goodman, 2002); this form was not completed for the late adolescence/emerging 
adult sample. This teacher-report measure is intended for use in the larger research study, and 
was not used as part of the current MA thesis project. Each participant session was comprised of 
a decision-making task, an interview, and a questionnaire. Sessions lasted approximately 45 
minutes, and were audio recorded for data collection and accuracy purposes. The grade 10 and 
11 sample completed the questionnaire first, on school premises, at which point they were given 
the option of signing up to complete the decision-making task and interview anywhere from two 
days to four weeks afterward. Data were entered into Wilfrid Laurier University’s online 
research software system, Qualtrics, and participants were debriefed upon completion (see 
Appendix C).  
Moral Hypocrisy Measure  
We used the original experimental procedure developed by Batson and colleagues 
(Batson et al., 1997), and adapted it for use with children and adolescents. As was the case in 
Batson’s procedure, participants were asked to make a decision where it is possible to appear fair 
while acting in their own self-interest. See Appendix B for the complete experimental procedure. 
The following is a summary of the decision-making task.  
The interviewer first explained that there were two games to be played: one that 
participants in previous studies had supposedly deemed to be the ‘Fun’ game, and one deemed 
simply ‘OK’. In the Fun game, participants had a chance to win a $25 iTunes gift card; no 
chance at such a prize was available through the OK game. Participants were told that our study 
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requires an equal number of participants to play each game, and therefore only some can decide 
which to play. The interviewer then identified that the participant was, in fact, one of those who 
got to decide. Participants were told that depending on which game they chose to play, the next 
student would be designated the opposite game, but would not be aware that the current 
participant made the choice. This lessened the possibility that participants’ decisions would be 
affected by concern regarding peer reactions. Next, the interviewer introduced a fairness 
standard: “Most people think it is most fair to give everyone an equal chance of playing each 
game. For example, by choosing an envelope from this bag, and seeing what the ticket inside 
says” (interviewer shows participant an opened envelope and ticket). Tickets that assign the 
participant to the Fun game were included in case a participant decided to open multiple 
envelopes in efforts to find one with a desirable outcome, or out of suspicion that the raffle was 
rigged. The ratio of OK tickets to Fun tickets was 20:10 as opposed to 50:50 to ensure that a 
larger number of participants were presented with the opportunity to act with either moral 
integrity or moral hypocrisy than were presented with the opportunity to accept the assignment to 
the Fun condition, or to display prosocial behaviour (the two possible outcomes of opening a Fun 
ticket). 
The participant was then asked for their opinion. “Is this a good way to decide?” and 
“What would be a fair way to decide?” These questions ensured that the participant understood 
the demand for being fair, and allowed the researcher to record the participant’s beliefs regarding 
fairness behaviour. The interviewer then explained that the participant would be left to make 
their own decision, by checking off one option on a sheet of paper – either “I play FUN game; 
next student plays OK game” or “I play OK game; next student plays FUN game” – and placing 
it in a designated letter-sized envelope (as opposed to the miniature envelopes used in the raffle 
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draw). The interviewer once again reminded the participant that the decision is completely up to 
them, and that they can make their decision by selecting a miniature envelope from the raffle 
bag, or make their choice without drawing a ticket. The participant was also reminded that the 
next participant will not know that they made the decision, and will simply be told which game 
they have been assigned.  
The interviewer then got up from the table and exited the room for a few minutes. Upon 
returning, they asked the participant “I don’t need to know what choice you made right now, but 
I’m curious – did you use the envelopes to help you decide?” Similar to the question “did you 
flip the coin to make your decision?” in Batson’s studies, this allowed the researcher to record 
whether the participant says they have used an envelope (whether or not they actually did). The 
participant was then asked to rate how happy they were with the decision they made on a scale of 
1-5 (1 = very unhappy, 2 = unhappy, 3 = OK, 4 = happy, 5 = very happy). Participants in the 
middle childhood and early adolescence samples were asked to select one of five faces on a 
supplemental visual Likert scale.  
When the interview session was completed, and the participant had left the room, the 
researcher checked whether the participant opened a miniature envelope, and entered ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ into the computer system. If the participant did open a ticket envelope, the researcher also 
recorded whether the ticket inside assigned them to the ‘OK’ or the ‘Fun’ game. The 10 
envelopes assigning participants to the ‘Fun’ game had previously been marked with a tiny dot 
of ink (not noticeable to participants) to ensure accuracy in this step. If the participant had left an 
opened envelope behind, the researcher could easily identify by this dot whether the ticket had 
assigned them to the OK or the Fun game; alternatively, if the participant chose to take the 
envelope with them, the researcher was able to count the envelopes left in the raffle bag to 
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determine the outcome of the ticket in question. Although we did not track this, a small minority 
took the ticket envelope with them. Most participants left the opened ticket envelope on the desk. 
The ticket draw worked as a randomized procedure, and the researcher only became aware of the 
outcome of the ticket draw once the participant left the room. Once the researcher determined 
whether a ticket envelope was drawn, they opened the letter-sized envelope to record what 
option the participant chose to assign themselves.  
It is important that participants believed that they would be playing either the ‘Fun’ game 
or the ‘OK’ game upon completion of the interview portion of the session, while in reality there 
was no such game. The decision-making task was necessary to collect data on individuals’ 
fairness behaviour, but actual participation in a game was unnecessary. Participants were 
debriefed as to the actual purpose of the decision-making task upon completion of the interview 
session (see Appendix C).  
Coding Schemes 
Fairness standard 
 Responses to this question were coded as follows: a value of 1 was given to participants 
who said the raffle was a fair way, a value of 2 was given to participants who indicated some 
other random procedure (e.g. “rock paper scissors”), and a value of 3 was given to any 
participants whose decision-making strategy involved communication with the other participants 
(e.g. “I would prefer to ask the next person what their preference is”). Responses that included 
raffle and some other random procedure (e.g. “raffle, or coin flip”) were given a value of 1. Two 
responses were ambiguous (“I’ll just play the OK game”, and “alternative choices”), and were 
therefore excluded from data analyses related to the fairness question in the interview.  
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Ticket draw 
Next, we coded the categorical variable ticketdraw. Values for ticketdraw reflected 
whether a participant chose to participate in the raffle draw, as well as whether the ticket 
assigned them to the Fun game or to the OK game. A value of 1 was assigned to those who drew 
a ticket that assigned them to the Fun game, a value of 2 was assigned to those who drew a ticket 
assigning them to the OK game, and a value of 3 was assigned to those who did not choose to 
select a ticket during the decision-making task.  
Decision 
Regardless of whether a participant chose to open a ticket, all participants were required 
to make a decision by selecting either “I play OK game; Next student plays FUN game”, or “I 
play FUN game; Next student plays OK game.” The variable decision refers to which game the 
participant decided to assign themselves to, regardless of whether they used a ticket to make their 
choice. A value of 1 was assigned to those who selected ‘I play the FUN game; the next student 
plays the OK game’, and a value of 2 was given to those who selected ‘I play the OK game; the 
next student plays the FUN game’. 
Decision-making pattern variable 
To answer our primary research question, we used the variables ticketdraw and decision 
to create a new variable called decision making in experiment. This variable allowed us to 
capture the six possible outcomes that exist for this decision-making task (see Table 1).  
Of those who chose to participate in the raffle, some drew a ticket that assigned them to 
the ‘OK’ condition, and assigned themselves to the ‘OK’ condition. For the purposes of this 
study, we say that these participants have chosen to act with moral integrity (ticketdraw = 2; 
decision = 2). Others drew a ticket that assigned them to the ‘OK’ condition, and chose to assign 
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themselves to the ‘Fun’ condition. These participants demonstrated moral hypocrisy, or the 
desire to appear moral by using the fairness standard without actually being moral (ticketdraw = 
2; decision = 1). Additionally, there were those who drew a ticket that assigned them to the ‘Fun’ 
condition, and chose to assign themselves to the ‘OK’ condition. These participants are 
considered prosocial (ticketdraw = 1, decision = 2). Those who participated in the raffle, drew a 
ticket that assigned them to the ‘Fun’ condition, and chose to assign themselves to the ‘Fun’ 
condition were excluded from any statistical analyses, as they simply had good luck in the ticket 
draw and their motivation to choose the ‘Fun’ game remains ambiguous (n = 35, 13.5%) 
(ticketdraw = 1, decision = 2).  
Those who choose not to draw a raffle ticket either assign themselves to the ‘Fun’ 
condition (acting in self-interest; ticketdraw = 3, decision = 1), or to the ‘OK’ condition (acting 
according to the prosocial pattern; ticketdraw = 3, decision = 2). All subsequent analyses are 
based on these four decision making patterns: self-interest, moral hypocrisy, prosocial behaviour, 
and moral integrity.  
Results 
We begin by reporting frequency and descriptive information for questions asked of 
participants during the experimental portion of the procedure. We then report frequencies and 
age-related findings for whether participants opened a ticket envelope, and for what game they 
decided to assign themselves to. Finally, we report age-related findings with regards to 
participants’ decision-making patterns.  
Fairness Judgment  
The initial question that participants were asked as part of the decision-making task was 
about the fairness of the ticket draw. Interviewers asked participants “is this a good way to make 
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the decision?”, and recorded participant responses of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Frequency counts show that 
98% of participants agreed that the raffle was a good way to make the decision. See Table 2 for 
detailed results according to age group. A chi-square test for independence showed no significant 
effect of age on participant response, χ2 (3, n = 260) = 4.98, p = 0.173.  
Immediately after being asked whether they think that the raffle would be a good way to 
decide, interviewers asked the participant “what would be a fair way to decide?”. Eighty-one 
percent of participants said the raffle would be a fair way, 15.8% cited another random decision-
making procedure, and 2.7% indicated preference for interpersonal communication. See Table 3 
for a breakdown of answers according to age group. Again, a chi-square test for independence 
showed no significant effect of age on participant response, χ2 (6, n = 260) = 9.54, p = 0.146.   
Use of Ticket Draw 
Frequencies for use of the fairness standard (independent of the ticket outcome) were as 
follows: 110 (42.3%) participants chose to open a ticket envelope, and 150 (57.7%) participants 
chose not to open a ticket envelope. See Table 4 for a breakdown of age differences. A 4 X 2 chi-
square analysis of age group and decision to open a ticket yielded a significant effect of age, 
χ2(3, n = 260) = 24.06, p < 0.001. Of note is that 83.1% of students in grades 4 and 5 did not 
open a ticket envelope; only 16.9% chose to do so (z = -3.1). The only participant who opened 
multiple tickets opened three, all of which read “I play OK game; Next student plays FUN 
game”. This participant was coded as one of those who did open a ticket envelope.  
Reported Use of Ticket Draw  
 Participants were asked directly after they made their decision whether they used a ticket 
to make their choice. One hundred thirteen participants (43.5%) said that yes, they had opened a 
ticket envelope, while 147 (56.5%) reported that they had not. This reported use of the ticket 
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draw in decision-making differs by five points from the actual use of the ticket draw. Evidently, 
five participants falsely reported the use of the ticket draw. Three of these participants were in 
grades 7 & 8, one in grades 10 & 11, and one in first- and second-year university. Of these five 
participants, three of them chose the Fun game for themselves, and two assigned the Fun game to 
the next student. Also of note is that two participants who opened ticket envelopes lied and said 
they did not. Both of these participants had opened tickets that assigned them to the OK game, 
but chose the Fun game, therefore were coded as having acted with moral hypocrisy.  
Ticket Outcome 
 As mentioned in the methods section, the ratio of OK tickets to Fun tickets was 20:10, to 
ensure that the response pattern of drawing the Fun ticket and choosing the Fun game remains 
relatively infrequent. Closely reflecting the intended ratio of 20:10, 66.1% of tickets opened read 
“I play OK game; Next student plays FUN game”, and 33.9% read “I play FUN game; Next 
student plays OK game”. Note that in this case the 151 participants who chose not to open a 
ticket envelope were removed from this analysis. 
Decision	
One hundred forty-four (54.2%) participants assigned themselves to the Fun game, and 
119 (45.8%) participants assigned themselves to the OK game. See Table 5 for a breakdown of 
age differences. A 4 X 2 chi-square analysis run on age group versus decision yielded a 
significant effect of age, χ2 (3, n = 260) = 37.41, p < 0.001. Age groups differed significantly in 
whether they chose to play the Fun game or the OK game. As age increased, participants were 
less likely to assign themselves to the Fun game, and more likely to assign themselves to the OK 
game.   
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Age-related Differences in Decision-making Pattern  
 Frequency counts for decision-making patterns were as follows: 41.3% of the 260 
participants acted with self-interest, 5.8% acted with moral hypocrisy, 26.2% acted with 
prosocial behaviour, and 26.7% acted with moral integrity. A chi-square test for independence 
was carried out to examine whether the distribution of participants across the four possible 
behavioural outcomes differed across age groups. In other words, is the tendency of participants 
to act in accordance with moral hypocrisy, moral integrity, prosocial behaviour or self-interest 
related to age? A 4 X 4 chi-square analysis yielded a significant effect of age, χ2(9, n = 225) = 
56.01, p < 0.001 (see Table 6). Age was significantly related to participants’ decision-making 
pattern (see also Figure 1).  
The following general trends can be identified: self-interest decreased with age, with the 
large majority of the decrease occurring between middle childhood (z = 4.2) and early 
adolescence (z = -0.4). None of the standardized residuals for moral hypocrisy across the four 
age groups deviated significantly from chance. Percentages for the first three groups ranged 
between 6.5% and 9.1%, and fell to 0% between age groups 3 and 4. Thus, although rare in 
occurrence, moral hypocrisy was stable from middle childhood to late adolescence. Prosocial 
behaviour increased with age, with the majority of the increase occurring between middle 
childhood (z = -2.3) and early adolescence (z = 0.2). Moral integrity also increased with age, 
following a steadier trend between middle childhood and early adolescence as well as between 
early adolescence and middle adolescence. This behavioural pattern remained steady between 
middle adolescence and emerging adulthood. See Table 6 for detailed results.  
Those in the middle childhood age group (grades 4 and 5) were most likely to act with 
self-interest (75%, z = 4.2). In contrast, only 23% (z = -2.2) of those in age group 4 (first- and 
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second-year university) acted with self-interest. The proportion of participants in grade 4 and 5 
who acted prosocially (11.3%, z = -2.3) also differed significantly from what we would expect 
due to chance, as did participants from grade 4 and 5 who acted in accordance with moral 
integrity (6.5%, z = -1.9). Of marginal significance were those participants in age group 4 (first- 
and second-year university) who acted with moral integrity (39.3%, z = 1.9) and those who acted 
with moral hypocrisy (0%, z = -1.9).  
An Alternate Analysis 
 The previous analyses were based on all four decision-making patterns. An alternative 
approach to analyzing this data that is equivalent to the way Batson et al. (1997) reported 
findings is to examine the decision-making patterns of only those participants who drew a ticket. 
These individuals have arrived at a junction where the next step of the decision-making task is 
either to decide for the Fun game or the OK game. Of those who did draw a raffle ticket, what 
percentage chose the Fun game versus the OK game? 
Decision of participants who drew a ticket. Of the 110 participants who took part in the 
raffle draw, 46 (41.8%) participants assigned themselves to the Fun game, and 64 (58.2%) 
participants assigned themselves to the OK game. Note that the odds to draw to a ticket for the 
Fun game versus the OK game were 2:1. Thus, if all participants decided according to the 
outcome of the ticket draw 33% would have opted for the Fun game. The actual number (41.8%) 
indicates that 8.8% of participants chose the Fun game even though the ticket draw assigned 
them to the OK game. In Batson's studies this number was typically 30-35%. A 4 X 2 chi-square 
analysis run on age group versus decision yielded a significant effect of age, χ2 (3, n = 110) = 
8.97, p < 0.05. As age increased, participants were significantly less likely to assign themselves 
DEVELOPMENT	OF	MORAL	HYPOCRISY	AND	MORAL	INTEGRITY	
	
28	
to the Fun game, and significantly more likely to assign themselves to the OK game. See Table 7 
for a breakdown of age differences.  
Age differences in decision-making pattern for those who drew an OK game ticket. 
Percentages within age group for the decision-making patterns of the 73 participants who 
drew an OK game ticket were as follows: 17.8% decided to play the FUN game (thus, acted with 
moral hypocrisy) and 82.2% decided to play the OK game (thus, acted with moral integrity).  
A 4 X 2 chi-square test for independence was carried out to examine whether the distribution of 
participants across the four possible behavioural outcomes differed across age groups. The test 
yielded a significant effect of age, χ2(3, n = 73) = 11.806, p < 0.01 (see Table 8). Age was 
significantly related to participants’ decision-making pattern, such that moral integrity increased 
with age (from 50% of the youngest age group to 100% of the eldest age group), and moral 
hypocrisy decreased with age (from 50% of the youngest age group to 0% of the eldest age 
group).  
Self-reported satisfaction with decision 
 An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed to examine the relationship between 
participant’s decision-making pattern and their reported level of satisfaction with the decision 
they made. We ran the analysis with decision-making pattern (1 = self-interest, 2 = moral 
hypocrisy, 3 = prosocial behaviour, 4 = moral integrity) as the independent factor and reported 
level of satisfaction (on a scale of 1-5) as the dependent variable. The mean difference level was 
significant, F(3, 221) = 6.979, p < 0.001. A Scheffe post-hoc test (p < .05) showed that means for 
reported satisfaction levels differed significantly between the self-interest and moral integrity 
groups, as well as between prosocial and moral integrity groups. Decision-making pattern was 
significantly related to participants’ reported satisfaction level, such that those in the self-interest 
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and prosocial behaviour groups were significantly happier than those in the moral integrity 
group. The moral hypocrisy group did not significantly differ from any other decision-making 
pattern. See Table 9 for the means and standard deviations for each decision-making pattern.  
Gender differences in decision-making pattern 
 A 4 X 2 chi-square test for independence was performed to examine the relationship 
between decision-making pattern and gender. The relationship between these variables was not 
significant, c2(3, N=225) = 0.51, p = 0.92. Gender did not appear to have a significant impact on 
participants’ decision-making pattern.  
Discussion 
The current study was designed to examine the development of moral hypocrisy versus 
moral integrity across childhood, adolescence, and emerging adulthood.	Research into the 
development of fairness has shown that children’s beliefs and behaviour become increasingly 
fairness-oriented as they age. Behavioural economics literature confirms this trend. However, 
social psychologist Batson provided evidence that fair behaviour in adulthood is not primarily 
due to the desire to be fair, but rather to appear fair to others. Shaw and colleagues (2014) found 
evidence of moral hypocrisy in children ages 6-11, although at substantially lower rates than 
Batson. Our experimental procedure aimed to investigate changes in this tendency towards moral 
hypocrisy or moral integrity across a wider range of ages. By doing so, we hoped to answer 
questions of moral development that have thus remained at least partially unanswered. Does the 
desire to be fair increase with age? What about the motivation to appear fair? How does the 
desire to appear moral develop in relation to the desire to be consistent with one’s moral beliefs? 
When given an opportunity to do so, will children, adolescents, and emerging adults act in their 
own self-interest while maintaining the appearance of fairness?  
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We hypothesized that purely self-interested behaviour would decrease with age, and that 
the motivations both to be fair (moral integrity) as well as to appear fair (moral hypocrisy) 
would increase with age. Such results would support previous fairness research and provide a 
more detailed picture of the development of moral hypocrisy as conceptualized by Batson.  
To measure these expected developmental changes in behaviour, we adapted Batson and 
colleagues’ (1997) decision-making task for use with children and adolescents. The revisions 
made to the decision-making task allowed us to record the result of the ticket draw for each 
participant. We also included a satisfaction measure, which served to determine whether 
participants’ reported level of satisfaction with their decision was related to the decision-making 
pattern they used. As such, our experimental measure collected participant beliefs regarding 
fairness, actual decision-making behaviour, as well as reported level of satisfaction with the 
decision made. Current research is crucial to understanding the development of moral motivation 
and behaviour across childhood, adolescence, and emerging adulthood. This discussion begins 
with an examination of participants’ judgment about fairness, followed by a discussion of 
empirical findings as per the research questions outlined in the introduction.  
Fairness Judgment 
 When presented with the fairness standard of the raffle draw, almost all participants 
agreed that it was a good way to make the decision. Age-groups did not significantly differ with 
regard to this fairness judgment. Regardless of how they would end up making their decision, or 
what their decision would be, only a few participants questioned the fairness of the raffle ticket 
system. This somewhat resembles Damon’s research involving hypothetical and actual decision-
making scenarios, specifically those where he identifies a lag between children’s beliefs and 
behaviour (Damon, 1977). Fairness research shows that people’s judgments about what would be 
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fair in a given scenario develop sooner than their actual behaviour. The question “is this a good 
way to make the decision?” cannot be directly compared to Damon’s hypothetical scenarios, as it 
is asked after participants are aware that they will soon be asked to make an actual decision. 
Despite this difference, perhaps similar principles apply. Our results show that more participants 
agree with the fairness of the raffle system than actually use the raffle system and abide by it. 
The clear majority of participants who agreed that the raffle was a good way to make the 
decision went on to cite the raffle as a fair way when asked ‘what would be a fair way to make 
the decision?’. A small proportion of participants brought up an alternative random strategy, 
such as a coin flip or a game of rock paper scissors. Lastly, a few participants associated fairness 
with being aware of the next participant’s preferences and desires. These individuals presumably 
believed that a truly fair decision-making strategy would acknowledge the cause and effect 
nature of the decision they were facing, as well as individual differences in each participant’s 
desire to play the Fun game. It is important to note, though, that of the individuals whose 
answers we were able to code, the vast majority did indicate that the raffle was a fair way to 
make the decision. 
Ticket Draw and Outcome 
 Independent of their fairness judgment or what they chose to do with the result of their 
ticket draw, a little less than half of the participants chose to open a ticket envelope even though 
the concept of fairness was made salient via the introduction of the raffle. While the eldest three 
age groups did not vary significantly in whether they chose to use the fairness standard, the only 
group that differed significantly from the other groups was middle childhood, where only a very 
small portion selected a ticket. These results align with our hypothesis that unmitigated self-
interest influences decision-making more strongly in younger age groups, and that as age 
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increases, people are more likely to behave fairly, whether due to a true desire to be fair, or to a 
desire to appear fair.  
Decision 
 Without taking into consideration whether they chose to select a ticket, or whether their 
decision was a result of following the result of the ticket draw, about half of our sample ended up 
assigning themselves to the Fun game, and half to the OK game. As age increased, participants 
were less likely to choose the Fun game and more likely to choose the OK game. A ratio of 
50:50 would have signalled a fair outcome in Batson’s studies, but the same is not true in our 
case, with the ratio of 20 ‘OK’ tickets to 10 ‘Fun’ tickets. These results only reveal so much 
about participant behaviour, as they simply reflect the final decisions, and not how the 
participants made their decisions. For this information, we turn to a discussion of participant 
behaviour as captured by the decision-making pattern variable. 
Age-related Differences in Decision-making Pattern 
 Self-interest. In this experimental paradigm, self-interest was equated with choosing not 
to use the fairness standard (raffle), and assigning the Fun game to self, and the OK game to the 
next participant. We predicted that self-interest would decrease as age increased; our results 
support both this hypothesis, as well as literature cited in the introduction. The current study 
extends previous research in that includes child, adolescent, and adult samples.  
 It has been well documented that young children tend to behave with greater self-interest 
than older children and adults. With age, children’s understanding, beliefs, and behaviour about 
fairness become more sophisticated. Despite this decrease in self-interest being an expected 
trend, a couple of alternative explanations exist. First, the attractiveness of the Fun game and 
associated prize of a $25 iTunes gift card could have decreased as age increased. This would 
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justify a decrease in the tendency to assign oneself to the Fun game. However, roughly 25% of 
the emerging adult sample did act in accordance with self-interest. Evidently, the Fun game was 
still attractive enough to a quarter of the eldest age group for them to forego the fairness 
standard, and take the Fun game for themselves. 
A second explanation for the decrease in self-interested behaviour is that the youngest 
group was the least able to understand the raffle system, and subsequently, what was being asked 
of them. Perhaps confusion led these participants to take what they perceived to be the easiest 
way through the decision-making task. This explanation is less plausible, though, when held next 
to the data from the fairness beliefs question. When asked the question “what do you think – is 
this a good way to decide?”, 97% of the youngest age group said that the raffle was a good way 
to make the decision. If the raffle was indeed this confusing to the youngest participants, we 
would expect far fewer of them to agree with the validity of the fairness standard. 
 Moral integrity. Moral integrity was defined as drawing a raffle ticket and following 
through with the ticket assignment. As mentioned, those who drew a ticket that assigned 
themselves to the Fun game and the next student to the OK game were not considered part of this 
group, because they simply received the luck of the draw. It was not possible to ascertain what 
motivated them to follow through with the ticket assignment. Based on previous literature, we 
predicted that the moral integrity pattern would increase with age, and our results supported this 
hypothesis. As age increases, so does the desire for behaviour to match belief. This is consistent 
with moral identity research, which pinpoints adolescence as the critical period for moral identity 
formation. As mentioned, the current study adds the dimension of a wider age-range to a 
literature base where research is often conducted with either adults or children, but not both 
groups. 
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 Although this result was also expected, there are alternative possibilities to address. The 
most problematic is that perhaps participants did not realize that they had the option to cheat the 
system (i.e. act with moral hypocrisy), and therefore believed that their only option was to follow 
the ticket assignment. To borrow language cited in the introduction (Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 
2007), perhaps they did not perceive the ‘wiggle room’, or assumed that the interviewer would 
eventually check on them by reading what was inside their raffle ticket envelope. Each 
participant did have the option to take their raffle ticket with them (interviewers provided no 
instruction about what to do with the opened envelope), but the majority did leave it on the table. 
If this lack of perception were the case, what we consider moral integrity would arguably be 
another variant of moral hypocrisy, in which participants care more about appearing fair than 
about being fair. To minimize this possibility, interviewers left the room while participants were 
making their decisions, and stated twice that they did not need to know which game the 
participant chose – once before leaving the room, and once upon returning. Additionally, when 
Batson and colleagues revised their procedure to include a coin with a different colour on each 
side, allowing the observing experimenter to see the result of the coin flip, the hypocrisy pattern 
still emerged (Batson et al., 2002). The same was true when experimenters used a raffle system 
similar to the dictator game (Batson et al., 2006). This takes away credibility from the argument 
that it was lack of seeing the opportunity to cheat, and not moral integrity, that accounted for the 
prevalence of the moral integrity pattern.  
 Prosocial behaviour. There is one decision-making pattern that Batson does not 
differentiate from the others, and that is the prosocial pattern. We did not have a hypothesis 
regarding prosocial behaviour, in part because Batson does not address it. Batson’s procedure 
places all those who assign themselves the neutral consequences task into one group, regardless 
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of whether their decision was made according to the results of a coin flip. Because of this, we do 
not know if any of Batson’s participants receive the positive task for themselves, but choose to 
give it away. 
 Having revised Batson’s original procedure, we unexpectedly found that prosocial 
behaviour increases at roughly the same rate as moral integrity. This pattern is much more 
prevalent than expected, and, we suppose, also much more prevalent than Batson would 
presume, based on his exclusion of the group. Prosocial behaviour, characterized by using the 
fairness standard, receiving a ticket assignment to the Fun game, and proceeding to give it away 
to the next participant, or of choosing not to take a ticket, and choosing to give the Fun game to 
the next participant is most certainly not in line with moral hypocrisy. Even if what we deem 
moral integrity was indeed a variant of moral hypocrisy, the same cannot hold true of the 
prosocial pattern. These participants give the better option away even when the fairness standard 
was made clear, and when provided with the opportunity to assign themselves the better option. 
The increase of the prosocial pattern points to a strengthening moral motivation, albeit not in the 
way that we expected. In this case we see an increase in prosocial motivation rather than an 
increase in the motivation to be fair.  
 A counter-argument could again be made that perhaps participants care less about the 
Fun game and associated prize as they get older. But as stated, the fact that about a quarter of 
first- and second-year university students still act with self-interest suggests that this is not what 
is occurring. An even stronger case can be made by looking at the self-reported satisfaction 
levels for all four decision-making groups. Evidently, those in the prosocial group report the 
highest level of satisfaction with their decision. If the value of the Fun game decreased with age, 
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why would those who give the Fun game away rate themselves happier than those who act with 
moral integrity? 
 Another possible explanation for the prevalence of prosocial behaviour in this case is that 
many of our participants, although they are not aware of the identity of the next student, do know 
that it will be one of their classmates. In this way, the next participant is not a completely 
anonymous other, as is presumably true of other studies. These participants might be more 
strongly motivated to be prosocial with their peers than they would be with an anonymous next 
participant (recall the identifiable victim effect, Kogut, Slovic, & Vastfjall, 2016). However, the 
group that engages in the highest percentage of prosocial behaviour is the emerging adult 
sample, and peer relationships within university classes are typically more distant than those in a 
grade school or high school classroom. At the very least, relationships between university 
classmates likely would not differ from those in Batson’s studies. Overall, the existence and 
strength of the prosocial pattern lends credibility to the idea that what our measure labels as 
moral integrity is moral integrity, and not just a variant of moral hypocrisy.  
 Moral hypocrisy. Moral hypocrisy, defined as the desire to appear moral rather than to 
actually be moral, was associated with endorsing fairness by taking a raffle ticket, being assigned 
the OK game, and going against the ticket assignment to assign oneself to the Fun game. As 
mentioned, as age increased, so did the desire to be or at least to appear fair by participating in 
the raffle. Predictably, this led to an age-related increase in moral integrity. Surprisingly, it did 
not lead to the predicted increasing trend in moral hypocrisy. We hypothesized, based on 
previous research (Batson et al., 1997 & Shaw et al., 2014), that as age increased, so would the 
moral hypocrisy decision-making pattern. In practice, though two thirds of those who selected a 
ticket selected one that read “I play OK game; Next student plays FUN game”, only 13 
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participants went against this ticket assignment when provided the opportunity to do so. These 
13 participants represent only 5.8% of the total number of participants. This result differs greatly 
from Batson’s experiments, where about 80-85% of people who flip the coin assign themselves 
to the positive consequences task, leading to an estimate that about 35% are motivated by moral 
hypocrisy (50% would be expected due to chance).  
 As mentioned in the results section, roughly 40% of participants who used the fairness 
standard selected the Fun game versus the OK game even though the odds to draw a ticket for 
the OK game versus the Fun game were 2:1. From this, we can estimate the percentage of 
participants who drew a ticket and acted with moral hypocrisy. Batson’s analysis would end 
here. However, due to the use of the raffle draw rather than a coin flip, we were able to 
determine the exact percentages of moral hypocrisy and moral integrity that occurred in the 
group who participated in the ticket draw. Analyzed in this way, we see that moral hypocrisy 
occurred at a rate of 17.8%. This percentage remains relatively low compared to Batson’s rates 
of 30-35%, but is more comparable to both his results and Shaw and colleagues’ (2014) results 
of 11-13% moral hypocrisy in children. When we consider all 260 participants and all six 
potential behavioural outcomes, an analysis that we propose provides a broader picture of 
decision-making behaviour, moral hypocrisy occurs at a very low rate. When considered only in 
terms of those who did participate in the ticket draw, we find a total percentage slightly more 
comparable to that of Batson and that of Shaw and colleagues (2014), with a decreasing age-
related trend overall. 
 Possible reasons for this discrepancy are crucial to discuss. First, we address potential 
discrepancies in our methodology. Perhaps our Fun game was less attractive than Batson’s 
positive consequences task. But the positive consequences task was simply referred to as such. 
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Again, perhaps participants simply did not see the opportunity to cheat the system by acting with 
moral hypocrisy. The wiggle room afforded them may not have been obvious enough, despite the 
interviewer leaving the room and communicating that they did not need to know the outcome of 
the participant’s decision.  
A third explanation, as yet unaddressed, concerns the possible existence of self-deception 
(Batson et al., 1999). A coin flip is arguably more malleable than a raffle, in that it is easier to 
trick yourself into believing that the result of a coin flip is in your favour than it is to do so with a 
ticket containing one clearly stated outcome. Batson and colleagues refer to the former behaviour 
as fiddling the coin flip. This reduced ability to engage in self-deception could impact our rates 
of moral hypocrisy. However, when Batson and colleagues developed a test to determine 
whether self-deception had an influence on their results, labelling the coin “SELF to POS” on 
one side, and “OTHER to POS” on the other side, they found similar frequencies of moral 
hypocritical behaviour (Batson et al., 1999, 2002). This indicates that the potential of self-
deception was not likely an influencing factor in the discrepancy between our results. 
An additional hypocrisy measure. Although not explicitly stated as such, an alternative 
way to appear moral without actually behaving morally in this experiment was to lie about the 
use of the ticket draw. If moral hypocrisy is such a central moral motivation, we should see a 
greater percentage of participants foregoing the ticket draw and proceeding to lie about it and say 
that they did select a ticket. This would easily serve to maintain the appearance of being fair 
while still acting in accordance with one’s own self-interest. As it stands, only five participants 
said they used a ticket to make their decision, but actually did not.  
Naturally, another explanation for these drastically different findings is that moral 
hypocrisy is simply not as prevalent as Batson conceives it to be. Perhaps the trend towards 
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moral hypocrisy does not similarly apply to all populations. The results of the current study 
contrast with the idea that moral hypocrisy is common and becomes an increasingly solidified 
motivational structure with age. Even when manipulations to the procedure included labelled 
coins, coloured coins, or the inclusion of a raffle system, Batson consistently finds that people 
end up behaving according to the moral hypocrisy pattern, but we find this behavioural pattern 
occurs rarely. In fact, if there were to be a trend, it would represent a decrease in morally 
hypocritical behaviour, not an increase. 
Might the real endpoint of moral motivation be prosocial in nature rather than 
hypocritical? As previously stated, the prosocial decision-making pattern had the highest levels 
of reported happiness, and research on prosocial behaviour suggests the presence of a self-
sustaining feedback loop. Although these predictions remain speculative, we are at the very least 
left wondering if moral hypocrisy is as pervasive as Batson’s research finds. 
Levels of Reported Satisfaction  
 In addition to testing for age differences in decision-making behaviour, our study also 
looked at participants’ level of satisfaction with their decision. As mentioned in the results 
section, this was addressed by asking participants how happy they were with their decision on a 
scale of one to five, ranging from very unhappy to very happy. We did not have a specific 
hypothesis regarding these differences; however, we find evidence to suggest that there are 
indeed significant differences between the emotional consequences of each decision-making 
pattern. 
 Participants in the self-interest and prosocial groups are significantly more happy than 
moral hypocrisy and moral integrity groups. In other words, participants were happiest when 
they chose not to use the fairness standard and thus chose for themselves whether they would 
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play the Fun or OK game, or when they did use the fairness standard, but chose to give the Fun 
game away.  
 These findings warrant closer examination. Research cited in the introduction suggests 
that as moral identity matures, people become increasingly motivated by the desire for their 
behaviour to match their beliefs, and more likely to experience positive emotions after making 
moral decisions (Krettenauer et al., 2014). In this case, however, despite having acted in 
accordance with their internal beliefs, those in the moral integrity group were less satisfied with 
their choice than those who acted with self-interest or prosocial behaviour. Perhaps it is not 
moral hypocrisy that is the main competitor with fair behaviour, but rather a very real conflict 
between self-interest and fairness motives. Perhaps those in the moral integrity group did desire 
to play the Fun game, but chose the constraint of the fairness standard, a decision that resulted in 
lower levels of satisfaction. 
Alternatively, if we look at the other ‘moral’ choice, that of giving the Fun game away, 
we found higher reported levels of satisfaction, suggesting that prosocial behaviour might be 
more self-sustaining in nature. This is purely speculative at this point, but perhaps prosocial 
behaviour is better integrated into moral identity and the sense of self than moral integrity? There 
is literature that suggests the existence of an affective self-reward mechanism that assists people 
in maintaining prosocial behaviour (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2014). In research specifically 
utilizing economic games, it was found that giving to others increased children’s happiness 
levels (Kogut, 2012). Paulus and Moore (2016) find that 3-6-year-old children expected people 
to be happier after sharing than after not sharing.  
Wu, Zhang, Guo and Gros-Louis (in press) find that when giving is based on a social 
norm, such as merit, it does not lead to the increase in happiness brought on through autonomous 
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sharing. Similarly, Aknin, Hamlin, and Dunn (2012) find that giving rewards children with 
positive emotions, but only when it costs something to do so. Perhaps this provides a partial 
explanation as to why those who use the fairness standard and give the game away are not as 
satisfied with their decision. They have given based on the social norm of fairness, an action 
which Wu and colleagues would classify as obligated versus autonomous. Gebauer and 
colleagues (2008) suggest that prosocial behaviour can be motivated either by the anticipation of 
positive affect (pleasure) or by fulfilling a duty or conforming to a social norm (pressure). 
Further research is necessary, but our results suggest that in this case, it is motivated more by the 
former than by the latter.  
Limitations of Current Research 
 Some of the limitations of this study, several which have already been mentioned, are 
methodological in nature. The first is that we do not include a measure of the attractiveness of 
the Fun game and OK game. Therefore, we do not know for certain that the attractiveness level 
of the Fun game and associated prize do not decrease with age. A second limitation previously 
discussed is the possibility that participants did not see the chance to appear moral while acting 
in their own self-interest (i.e. did not perceive the wiggle room). As a consequence, we cannot 
fully rule out the possibility that the moral integrity group is therefore actually a variant of moral 
hypocrisy. A third limitation relates to our satisfaction rating. We did find significant differences 
in reported happiness levels dependent on decision-making pattern, but we do not employ a pre-
measure for satisfaction, and thus cannot control for the initial satisfaction level of each 
participant. Additionally, the fact that our high school sample participated in the decision-making 
task and interview after completing the questionnaire could be a potential confound. Though the 
decision-making task was completed anywhere from 1 week to 4 weeks after the questionnaire, 
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and though it took place in a different setting (one-on-one versus in a classroom with other 
students), the content of the questionnaire could have influenced participants’ decision-making 
behaviour.   
 As is the case with much research in developmental psychology, it is essential to 
highlight that this study was cross-sectional, and not longitudinal. We therefore do not know if 
the age differences observed are due to age or to cohort effects. The analysis of parent education 
levels indicated that our age groups do not differ in socio-economic status, but this also remains 
a possibility.  
Future Directions 
 In addition to addressing these limitations, further research should investigate the 
relationship between the decision-making patterns defined in this study and key aspects of the 
moral self, namely moral centrality and moral motivation. Moral centrality refers to the degree to 
which issues of morality are central to an individual’s sense of self, whereas moral motivation 
refers to whether an individual is motivated by internal or external factors. Moral motivation is 
distinct from moral centrality, in that both aspects play interrelated yet distinct roles in the moral 
self, and arguably differ in their developmental trajectories (Krettenauer, 2011). It is well 
documented that as age increases, people generally experience a shift from external to internal 
motivation. Batson speaks of this shift as a move from an ought to a want, and claims that while 
it occurs early in life in matters of propriety morality (principles of purity, loyalty, honor, and 
respect) it is quite rare in matters of interpersonal morality, which he associates with principles 
of fairness, doing no harm, care, and honesty (Batson, 2015). This rarity was not captured with 
the current experimental paradigm. 
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At the outset of this thesis project, we expected to find a decreasing trend in self-interest, 
compensated by increasing trends in behaviour signifying an ought (moral hypocrisy or 
externally motivated moral integrity) or a want (internally motivated moral integrity). What we 
found, however, seems to indicate that as age increases, individuals shift from self-serving 
motives to a desire to be moral (ought or want), and to the desire to behave prosocially. What do 
these results mean for the connection between moral decision-making and moral identity? 
When placed in the greater context of moral identity development, the current findings 
precipitate further research questions. Are individuals who score high in internal moral 
motivation more likely to behave with moral integrity? Conversely, are those who score high in 
external moral motivation more likely to behave with moral hypocrisy? Do those who score high 
in moral centrality tend to act with moral integrity or with prosocial behaviour? These questions 
need to be addressed in future research. 
Concluding Remarks 
Developmental and social psychologists have mixed opinions on whether there is 
sufficient evidence for the existence of moral identity. Some suggest that the concept of morality 
is outdated or broken (Batson et al., 2011), or that having a moral identity is the privilege of a 
select few highly moral people classed as “moral exemplars” (Colby & Damon, 1992). However, 
we find that moral hypocrisy is a far less likely outcome of moral development than moral 
integrity and prosocial behaviour. Current research informs the study of moral development and 
provides a basis for further research into the relationship between the moral self and moral 
behaviour. Results indicate that self-interest, moral hypocrisy, prosocial behaviour, and moral 
integrity are not basic and fixed human tendencies, and are instead constructs that change 
according to socialization and developmental processes.  
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 Appendix A: Introduction and Demographics 
Introduce yourself to child and explain general purpose of the meeting with child. 
 
Hi, my name is _______ and I am a student at university. The reason I am meeting with you 
today is that I am very interested in what children/teenagers like you think and feel about your 
own and other children's behaviours and values.  
 
Give brief overview of interview procedure and explain equipment. 
 
Before we start with the interview, let me briefly explain what we are going to do today. This 
study has three parts: an interview, questionnaire, and game. We will first do the interview 
together and then the questionnaire.  
 
The interview is about the importance of values in different situations of your life. I understand 
that this topic can be quite personal, at least for some people. To make it easier to talk about 
these things, I brought some picture boards with me. I will record the interview and put a 
personal identification code to the recording. Only you will know this code. Let me assure you 
that whatever you say is completely confidential.  
 
You should also know that no one is going to judge your answers as good or bad, right or wrong. 
So just say what you think and feel because this is what today is all about. If you don’t know an 
answer to one of my questions, you should just say “I don’t know”. Also, if you don’t understand 
something, please say so and I can explain it better. At any point, if you need a break or would 
like to stop, you may do so. When we are done with everything, you will get $7 for your 
participation.  
 
We first need to create your personal identification code. This code has letters and numbers that 
only you know. Tell me: What are the first two letters in your mother’s first name? What day of 
the month is your birthday? And what are the first two letters in your father’s name?  
 
So, this is your personal code [XX99YY].  
 
Do you have any questions right now? 
 
Ask child for oral assent: Great. Before starting, I need to ask you one more time: Are you okay 
with talking to me and filling out some questionnaires today?  
 
IF YES: So let’s start. 
 
IF NO: That’s okay. I will take you back to your classmates. 
 
First, we just need to know a little about your background before. Do the demographic questions 
with them on Qualtrics.  
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Appendix B: Experimental Procedure 
 
At the end of this interview you will play a computer game. The game is about how you react to 
other people’s decisions. There are two versions of the game that take the same amount of time. 
We’ve played these two versions of the game before in other studies.  
• In one version, many students your age feel it is really fun so let’s call it the “FUN” 
game. In the fun game, you have to react fast and you can collect points and if you collect 
enough points then you will get a chance to win a $25 iTunes gift card.  
 
• The other version of the game is slower and most students think it’s less fun so let’s call 
it the “OK” game. In the OK game, you have all the time you need for making your 
decisions. There are no points to collect and there is also no gift card to win at the end. 
But, you have the chance to learn about your decision-making in different situations.  
 
We need to make sure that we have the same number of people play both games. We can’t let 
everyone decide, but we do let some people decide which game they get to play. You are one of 
these students. You can choose one of the two games you want to play and whichever game you 
pick, the next student after you will play the other game. So if you choose the Fun Game, the 
next person will play the OK Game. If you choose the OK Game, the next student will play the 
Fun Game.  
 
Most people think that the fairest way to decide is to give everyone an equal chance of playing 
the fun game. For example, by drawing a raffle ticket, where we have an equal number of tickets 
for the fun game and the ok game. [Take out one envelope with one ticket, take out one ticket 
from the envelope, show to student what is in the envelope].  
 
What do you think – is this a good way to decide? What would be a fair way to make a decision? 
 
Now it’s up to you to decide. You are free to make your own decision. You can draw a ticket, 
but you don’t have to. You just need to make your decision by checking one of the two boxes 
here [point at form]. Either check the box that says “I play FUN game – Next student plays OK 
game” or “I play OK game – Next student plays FUN game”. After making your decision, put 
the form in this envelope. There is no rush; you can take all the time you need and no one will 
know you decided. We will tell the next student what game they are playing, but they won’t 
know that you made the decision. I will leave you alone for a moment to make your decision.  
 
Leave the room while the participant checks off the option they choose. Return to the student and 
ask “Are you ready?” Knock on the door to make sure the participant is finished circling their 
option.  
 
Ok great! I don’t want to know what you decided, but I am curious, “Did you draw a ticket?”  
 
On a scale of 1-5, how happy are you with your decision? 
Thank you for doing this. Now let’s begin the interview. 
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Appendix C: Closing and Debrief 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this study! Now that you’re finished, I want to tell you 
a little bit more about the study. You’re probably wondering when we’re going to play that game 
I mentioned we would do after the questionnaire. We won’t be playing the game, but every 
participant who participates in this study is entered into the raffle to win a $25 iTunes gift card. It 
does not matter what your answer was – everyone who does this study, including you, has a 
chance to win. We will let your school know if you won!  
 
Let me explain why you did the task of assigning the different games to you or another 
participant.  The goal of the research study is to collect information on how children and 
adolescents of different ages think and feel about moral issues in their everyday life and why 
they matter to them. One of the things we are looking at is how children and teenagers decide 
what to do when they want something and want to be fair. That was the goal of having you 
assign one of the games to yourself and the other to another participant. We actually ask all 
participants to do this, but there is no game that is played.  
 
I apologize for not telling you the full purpose of the study at the beginning. To protect the 
integrity (be prepared to define this term to children) of the research, I could not fully reveal 
the complete goal at the start of our session today. I hope you can see that if participants knew 
exactly what we were interested in, they might change their answers a little bit and we wanted 
the true behaviour in order to make sure the research conclusions are authentic.  
 
Remember that there were no wrong or right, or good or bad answers. No one will judge what 
you said or did today. Again, all the information you gave me today will be kept anonymous, 
which means it will be impossible for people to know what you said or what you wrote. 
 
You were very helpful today, thank you. Do you have any questions you would like to ask?  
 
Ok great, here is your compensation (for PREP sample, “I will assign your PREP credit”), and 
hope you have a great day!  
 
Provide the participant with a copy of this to give to their parent/guardian.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Possible Decision-making Patterns 
Decision Did participant draw a ticket? 
 Yes 
No Outcome of the ticket draw 
Fun game OK game 
Fun game *Lucky 
n = 35 
Moral hypocrisy 
n = 13 
Self-interest 
n = 93 
OK game Prosocial 
n = 4 
Moral integrity 
n = 60 
Prosocial 
n = 55 
Note. * = data excluded from main analyses (age group by decision-making pattern) 
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Table 2 
Fairness Judgment 
Response 
Age Group 
Total 
Grade 4/5 Grade 7/8 Grade 10/11 1st/2nd Year 
Yes  
 
63 
(96.9%) 
-0.1 
 
68 
(100%) 
0.2 
57 
(100%) 
0.1 
67 
(95.7%) 
-0.2 
255 
(98.1%) 
No  2 (3.1%) 
0.7 
0 
(0%) 
-1.1 
0 
(0%) 
-1.0 
3 
(4.3%) 
1.4 
5 
(1.9%) 
Total 65 (100%) 68 (100%) 57(100%) 70 (100%) 260 (100%) 
Note: Column % in parentheses. Standardized residuals (z) below column percent. 
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Table 3 
Fairness Strategy 
Response 
Age Group 
Total 
Grade 4/5 Grade 7/8 Grade 10/11 1st/2nd Year 
Raffle 
 
47 
(72.3%) 
-0.9 
 
59 
(86.8%) 
0.4 
44 
(78.6%) 
-0.3 
62 
(89.9%) 
0.7 
212 
(82.2) 
Other random 
 
16 
(24.6%) 
1.9 
 
7 
(10.3%) 
-1.1 
11 
(19.6%) 
0.8 
6 
(8.7%) 
-1.4 
40 
(15.5%) 
Communication 
 
2 
(3.1%) 
0.4 
 
2 
(2.9%) 
0.3 
1 
(1.8%) 
-0.3 
1 
(1.4%) 
-0.5 
6 
(2.3%) 
 
Total 65 (100%) 68 (100%) 56 (100%) 69 (100%) 
 
258 (100%) 
 
Note. Column % in parentheses. Standardized residuals (z) below column percent.  
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Table 4 
Use of Raffle in Decision-making 
Did the participant 
open a ticket 
envelope? 
Age Group 
Total 
Grades 4/5 Grades 7/8 Grades 10/11 1st/2nd Year 
Yes  11 (16.9%) 
-3.1 
31 
(45.6%) 
0.4 
31 
(54.4%) 
1.4 
37 
(52.9%) 
1.4 
110 
(42.3%) 
No  54 (83.1%) 
2.7 
37 
(54.4%) 
-0.4 
26 
(45.6%) 
-1.2 
 
33 
(47.1%) 
-1.2 
 
150 
(57.7%) 
Total 65 (100%) 68 (100%) 57 (100%) 70 (100%) 260 (100%) 
Note: Column % in parentheses. Standardized residuals (z) below column percent.   
  
DEVELOPMENT	OF	MORAL	HYPOCRISY	AND	MORAL	INTEGRITY	
	
51	
Table 5 
Decision 
Decision 
Age Group 
Total 
Grade 4/5 Grade 7/8 Grade 10/11 1st/2nd Year 
FUN game 
 
54 
(83.1%) 
3.2 
 
39 
(57.4%) 
0.3 
 
25 
(43.9%) 
-1.1 
 
23 
(32.9%) 
-2.4 
 
141 
(54.2%) 
OK game 
 
11 
(16.9%) 
-3.4 
 
29 
(42.6%) 
-0.4 
 
32 
(56.1%) 
1.2 
 
47 
(67.1%) 
2.6 
 
119 
(45.8%) 
Total 65 (100%) 68 (100%) 57 (100%) 70 (100%) 260 (100%) 
Note. Column % shown in parentheses. Standardized residuals (z) below column percent.  
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Table 6 
Crosstabulation of Decision-making Pattern and Age Group 
 
Decision-
making 
Pattern 
Age Group 
Total 
Grade 4/5 Grade 7/8 Grade 10/11 1st/2nd year 
Self-Interest 
 
47 
(75.8%) 
4.2 
21 
(38.2%) 
-0.4 
11 
(23.4%) 
-1.9 
14 
(23.0%) 
-2.2 
93 
(41.3%) 
Moral 
Hypocrisy 
 
 
4 
(6.5%) 
0.2 
 
5 
(9.1%) 
1.0 
 
4 
(8.5%) 
0.8 
 
0 
(0%) 
-1.9 
 
13 
(5.8%) 
Prosocial 
Behaviour 
 
 
7 
(11.3%) 
-2.3 
 
15 
(27.3%) 
0.2 
 
14 
(29.8%) 
0.5 
 
23 
(37.7%) 
1.8 
 
59 
(26.2%) 
Moral 
Integrity 
 
4 
(6.5%) 
-3.1 
 
14 
(25.5%) 
-0.2 
 
18 
(38.3%) 
1.5 
 
24 
(39.3%) 
1.9 
 
60 
(26.7) 
Total 62 (100%) 55 (100%) 47 (100%) 61 (100%) 225 (100%) 
Note. Column % in parentheses. Standardized residuals (z) below column percent.  
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Table 7 
 
Decision of Participants Who Drew a Ticket 
Decision 
Age Group 
Total 
Grade 4/5 Grade 7/8 Grade 10/11 1st/2nd Year 
FUN game 
 
7 
(63.6%) 
1.1 
 
17 
(54.8%) 
1.1 
 
13 
(41.9%) 
0.0 
 
9 
(24.3%) 
-1.6 
 
46 
(41.8%) 
OK game 
 
4 
(36.4%) 
-0.9 
 
14 
(45.2%) 
-1.0 
 
18 
(58.1%) 
0.0 
 
28 
(75.7%) 
1.4 
 
64 
(58.2%) 
Total 11 (100%) 31 (100%) 31 (100%) 37 (100%) 110 (100%) 
Note. Column % shown in parentheses. Standardized residuals (z) below column percent.  
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Table 8 
Crosstabulation of Decision-making Pattern and Age Group for Participants Who Drew an OK 
game ticket 
 
Decision-
making 
Pattern 
Age Group 
Total 
Grade 4/5 Grade 7/8 Grade 10/11 1st/2nd year 
Moral 
Hypocrisy 
 
 
4 
(50%) 
2.3 
 
5 
(26.3%) 
0.9 
 
4 
(18.2%) 
0.0 
 
0 
(0%) 
-2.1 
 
13 
(17.8%) 
Moral 
Integrity 
 
4 
(50%) 
-1.0 
 
14 
(73.7%) 
-0.4 
 
18 
(81.8%) 
0.0 
 
24 
(100%) 
0.3 
 
60 
(82.2%) 
Total 8 (100%) 19 (100%) 22 (100%) 24 (100%) 73 (100%) 
Note. Column % in parentheses. Standardized residuals (z) below column percent.  
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Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Level of Satisfaction by Decision-making Pattern  
Decision-making pattern Mean (SD) 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Self-interest 4.20a (0.745) 4.05 4.36 
Moral hypocrisy 4.00 a, b (0.816) 3.51 4.49 
Prosocial 4.41a (0.646) 4.24 4.58 
Moral integrity 3.78b (0.802) 3.55 4.02 
Note. Means with different superscripts indicate significant group differences (post hoc Scheffe, 
p < .05) 
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Figures 
 
	
	
	
Figure 1: Percentage of Age-group that Participated in each Decision-making Pattern 
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